While the ripples of America’s subprime-mortgage crisis have spread far and wide, Latin America—a place long associated with financial disaster—has remained improbably calm. Banks have reported no unpleasant surprises. Brazil and Peru have been blessed with coveted investment-grade ratings. Surprisingly, perhaps the fleetest country of all has been Argentina. Since it emerged from the financial crisis of 2001-02, it has been one of the world’s fastest-growing economies. It is expected to expand faster than most of its neighbors again this year.
Quite simply, it barely has any credit. Back when its economy virtually collapsed, the country suffered a run on its banks, followed by a freeze on withdrawals, and a massive currency devaluation. As a result, bank lending to the private sector shrivelled, from 23.8% of GDP in 2000 to 10.8% in 2003. Since then, it has rebounded to a piddling 13% ; by contrast, the ratio in Brazil was 36.5% in 2006. Almost all of these loans in Argentina are accessible only on a short-term basis.
Once its recovery began in June 2002, Argentina became a paradise for business. Unemployment of over 20% kept wages down, and the devaluation gave exporters an edge on foreign competitors. The ample productive capacity left idle by the crisis meant firms could expand without making big investments. And the windfall profits reaped by agricultural exporters, thanks to record commodities prices, enabled many of them to finance new projects out of earnings. Hence the economy could grow at almost 9% a year with little need for credit.
But such a lucky confluence of factors could not last. Starting in early 2005 ,.inflation picked up, a sign that the installed capacity was starting to limit output. Salaries and prices for raw materials increased sharply, cutting into profits. And farmers were particularly hard hit when the government nearly doubled the taxes in farm exports. Now, just as companies need to embark on big investments if they are to keep growing, their margins are no longer big enough to pay for the expansion and they need to borrow.
So, the time is ripe for the country’s financial system to recover. But a number of things are in the way. Foremost is Argentina’s business risk. Those in the informal economy (which represents over 40% of GDP) can neither save nor borrow legally, lest they become known to the taxmen. The rest remain cowed by memories of the crisis. Although Argentines have poured their savings into property, fuelling a construction boom, they still hold about four-fifths of their deposits abroad.
Inflation, fuelled by a public-spending binge, state-mandated wage increases, and a cheap currency, is not helping either. No one knows how high it is. The consumer-price index is doctored to keep the official rate below 10%, but private estimates suggest it is near 25%. Without a reliable index of inflation, lending is almost impossible, even for the medium term. And the central bank has kept interest rates ply negative in real terms, encouraging workers to spend their wages rather than to save.
There is no reliable index of inflation, because（）
A. the currency is cheap
B. there are different ways to get the index
C. the index have been manipulated by the government
D. the central bank has kept rates low
参考答案：C
解析：
[考点] 事实细节
通过问题题干出现的关键词index，我们很容易就把答案定位到最后一段。文章最后一段中的doctor是解题的关键，doctor当动词用于被动语态“is doctored”时，意思为“修改的，篡改的，操控的”，原文提到两个截然不同的通货膨胀指数，政府的10%和民间的25%，并指出了政府的指数被doctored，言下之意政府的指数靠不住，从下文的“缺少可靠的通货膨胀指数，人们几乎不可能借贷”，我们可以看出作者对民间的指数也缺乏信任。因此选项C符合原文，是正确答案。
[干扰项分析] 选项A是通货膨胀带来的恶果，跟统计通货膨胀指数没有直接关系，应该排除。原文提到了官方和民间两个不同的数据，并没有提出具体的统计方法，更没有说明统计方法不同而带来不同结果，因此选项B不符合原文。原文提到“中央银行维持低利率”，说明政府鼓励消费，消费的热潮进而促使了通货膨胀，这跟通货膨胀指数的统计并没有关系，因此选项D也应该排除。