问题 问答题

200×年×月×日凌晨3时许,某县龙泉矿冶总厂下属的某矿发生特大透水事故,造成某矿等三矿井下81名矿工死亡,直接经济损失8千余万元。 经调查,这是一起因某县大厂矿区在政府有关部门明令停产整顿期间,擅自组织矿工冒险下矿作业,非法开采、以采代挖、滥采滥挖,矿业秩序混乱,违章爆破引发特大透水的重大责任事故。 更为严重的是:事故发生后,原某县县委书记万某某与原某县县长唐某某、县委副书记莫某某、副县长韦某某密谋后,决定对此事故不按国务院《特别重大事故调查程序暂行规定》上报及组织抢救、调查,而是将事故真相隐瞒起来,并督促龙泉矿冶总厂处理好事故善后工作,防止事故消息泄露。事故真相隐瞒不报达半个月之久。这一隐瞒特大事故的行为,在国内外造成了极为恶劣的影响。 后经法院判决,被告人万某某犯受贿罪、滥用职权罪,依法判处死刑,剥夺政治权利终身,并处没收个人财产人民币50万元。被告人万某某的非法所得人民币268.5万元,依法没收,上缴国库。被告人唐某某犯受贿罪、挪用公款罪、滥用职权罪,依法判处有期徒刑20年,剥夺政治权利3年,并处没收财产人民币20万元。其非法所得人民币36万元、美元1000元,依法没收,上缴国库。被告人莫某某犯受贿罪、滥用职权罪,依法判处有期徒刑10年,并处没收财产人民币3万元。非法所得人民币7万予以没收,上缴国库。被告人韦某某犯受贿罪、滥用职权罪,判处有期徒刑13年,并处没收财产人民币4万元。被告人黎某某,原系某县龙泉矿冶总厂法定代表兼总经理,犯非法采矿罪、重大责任事故罪、妨害作证罪和单位行贿罪,判处有期徒刑20年,并处罚金人民币20万元。龙泉矿冶总厂其他22名原主管和员工,分别犯非法采矿罪,重大责任事故罪,妨害作证罪,单位行贿罪,非法持有枪支、弹药罪等各罪中的一罪或数罪,均受到法律应有的判处。 另外,被告单位某县龙泉矿冶总厂犯非法采矿罪,判处罚金人民币2000万元,犯单位行贿罪,判处罚金人民币400万元,决定执行罚金2400万元;该厂被冻结在银行的存款,扣除以上罚金后,余下的241299076.86元非法采矿的违法所得予以没收,上缴国库。 根据以上内容回答下列问题。 1.生产经营单位发生重大生产安全事故时,生产经营单位主要负责人应如何处理 2.特大安全事故发生后,有关县(市、区)、市(地、州)和省、自治区、直辖市人民政府及政府有关部门应当怎样处理 3.生产经营单位为防止重大事故发生,应做好的工作主要有哪些

答案

参考答案:

解析:1.(1)生产经营单位主要负责人在本单位发生重大生产安全事故时,应立即组织抢救,并且在事故调查处理期间不能撤离职守或者逃匿。 (2)生产经营单位主要负责人对生产安全事故不得隐瞒不报、谎报或者拖延不报。 (3)生产经营单位发生生产安全事故造成人员伤亡、他人财产损失的,应当依法承担赔偿责任,拒不承担或者其负责人逃匿的,由人民法院依法强制执行。 (4)生产经营单位不能与从业人员订立协议,免除或者减轻其对从业人员因生产安全事故伤亡依法应承担的责任。 2.特大安全事故发生后,有关县(市、区)、市(地、州)和省、自治区、直辖市人民政府及政府有关部门应当按照国家规定的程序和时限立即上报,不得隐瞒不报、谎报或者拖延报告,应当立即赶到事故现场,组织事故抢救,并应当配合、协助事故调查,不得以任何方式阻碍、干涉事故调查。不得阻挠、干涉对特大安全事故有关责任人员追究行政责任。 3.生产经营单位的决策机构、主要负责人、个人经营的投资人应做好以下工作: (1)依照法律规定保证安全生产所必需的资金投入,使生产经营单位具备安全生产条件; (2)按照规定设立安全生产管理机构或者配备安全生产管理人员的; (3)危险物品的生产、经营、储存单位以及矿山、建筑施工单位的主要负责人和安全生产管理人员按照规定经考核合格,持证上岗, (4)生产经营单位应当对从业人员进行安全生产教育和培训,保证从业人员具备必要的安全生产知识,熟悉有关的安全生产规章制度和安全操作规程,掌握本岗位的安全操作技能。未经安全生产教育和培训合格的从业人员,不得上岗作业; (5)生产经营单位应当教育和督促从业人员严格执行本单位的安全生产规章制度和安全操作规程;并向从业人员如实告知作业场所和工作岗位存在的危险因素、防范措施以及事故应急措施; (6)生产经营单位的特种作业人员应按照规定经专门的安全作业培训并取得特种作业操作资格证书,上岗作业; (7)生产经营单位对重大危险源应当登记建档,进行定期检测、评估、监控,并制定应急预案,告知从业人员和相关人员在紧急情况下应当采取的应急措施。 生产经营单位应当按照国家有关规定将本单位重大危险源及有关安全措施、应急措施报有关地方人民政府负责安全生产监督管理的部门和有关部门备案; (8)生产经营单位新建、改建、扩建工程项目(以下统称建设项目)的安全设施,必须与主体工程同时设计、同时施工、同时投入生产和使用。安全设施投资应当纳入建设项目概算。

单项选择题

During the past 15 years, the most important component of executive pay packages, and the one .most responsible for the large increase in the level of such compensation, has been stock-option grants. The increased use of option grants was justified as a way to align executives’ interests with shareholders’. For various tax, accounting, and regulatory reasons, stock-option grants have largely comprised "at-the-money options": rights to purchase shares at an "exercise price" equal to the company’s stock price on the grant date. In such at-the-money options, the selection of the grant date for awarding options determines the options’ exercise price and thus can have a significant effect on their value.
Earlier research by financial economists on backdating practices focused on the extent to which the company’s stock price went up abnormally after the grant date, My colleagues and I focused instead on how a grant-date’s price ranked in the distribution of stock prices during the month of the grant. Studying the universe of about 19,000 at-the-money, unscheduled grants awarded to public companies’ CEOs during the decade 1996-2005, we found a clear relation between the likelihood of a day’s being selected as a grant date for awarding options, and the rank of the day’s stock price within the price distribution of the month: a day was most likely to be chosen if the stock price was at the lowest level of the month, second most likely to be chosen if the price was at the second-lowest level, and so forth. There is an especially large incidence of "lucky grants" (defined as grants awarded on days on which the stock price was at the lowest level of the month): 12 percent of all CEO option grants were lucky grants, while only 4 percent were awarded at the highest price of the month.
The passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in August 2002 required firms to report grants within two days of any award. Most firms complied with this requirement, but more than 20 percent of grants continued to be reported after a long delay. Thus, the legislation could be expected to reduce but not eliminate backdating. The patterns of CEO luck are consistent with this expectation: the percentage of grants that were lucky was a high 15 percent before enactment of the law, and declined to a lower, but still abnormally high, level of 8 percent afterwards.
Altogether, we estimate that about 1,150 CEO stock-option grants owed their financially advantageous status to opportunistic timing rather than to mere luck. This practice was spread over a significant number of CEOs and firms: we estimate that about 850 CEOs ( about 10 percent) and about 720 firms ( about 12 percent) received or provided such lucky grants. In addition, we estimate that about 550 additional grants at the second-lowest or third-lowest price of the month owed their status to opportunistic timing.
The cases that have come under scrutiny thus far have led to a widespread impression that opportunistic timing has been primarily concentrated in "new economy" firms. But while the frequency of lucky grants has been somewhat higher in such firms, more than 80 percent of the opportunistically timed grants have been awarded in other sectors. Indeed, there is a significantly higher-than-normal incidence of lucky grants in each of the economy’s 12 industries.

It can inferred from the passage that

A.1150 CEOs have benefited financially from lucky grants.

B.more than 850 CEOs owe their success to mere luck.

C.opportunistic timing can provide unfair financial rewards.

D.lucky grants are widely spread over various industries.

单项选择题