问题 单项选择题

2002年1月,某市一家养鸡专业大户钱某养的鸡开始出现拉稀、消瘦等症状,2月就有 500多只鸡死亡,到3、4月份死鸡数量逐渐增加,钱某买了很多药都没能遏制死鸡,至2002年 5月,钱某共死鸡6000多只,购鸡苗和饲料等直接经济损失12000元,如果鸡长成,则每只按市场价可卖6元。钱某不得不停止了养鸡。钱某多方调查,发现邻近的一元化工厂2001年 12月扩大了生产,新增了化学产品品种,其厂内的废水经过一定处理直接储存在场内的废水池里,该废水池距离钱某养鸡场仅十多米,钱某怀疑是化工厂的废水池污染了地下水,导致他养的鸡饮水中毒,因此,钱某于2004年6月把一元化工厂诉至法院,以下说法正确的是:

A.法院不会支持钱某的诉讼请求,因为,已经经过了2年的诉讼时效

B.钱某应当科学地证明他的死鸡与一元化工厂的污染存在必然的因果关系

C.如果法院判决化工厂赔偿钱某,赔偿数额应当是36000元,包括钱某的可得利润

D.一元化工厂可以通过证明自己遵守了国家环境保护法律法规,且没有污染物排放为理由进行抗辩

答案

参考答案:C

解析:[测试点] 环境民事诉讼。 环境民事诉讼时效是3年,从当事人知道或者应当知道受到污染损害时起计算。所以选项A的说法错误。《民事诉讼证据规定》规定,因环境污染引起的损害赔偿诉讼,由加害人就法律规定的免责事由及其行为与损害结果之间不存在因果关系承担举证责任,所以选项B说法错误。环境污染损失的赔偿包括直接损失和间接损失,即包括可得利润。所以选项C说法正确。环境民事诉讼采用的是所谓的无过错责任,污染者不能以排污行为合法、没有过错为理由进行抗辩。所以选项D说法错误。

选择题
单项选择题

Here is a quick way to spoil a Brussels dinner party. Simply suggest that world governance is slipping away from the G20, G7, G8 or other bodies in which Europeans may hog up to half the seats. Then propose, with gloomy relish, that the future belongs to the G2: newly fashionable jargon for a putative body formed by China and America.

The fear of irrelevance haunts Euro-types, for all their public boasting about Europe’s future might. The thought that the European Union might not greatly interest China is especially painful. After all, the 21st century was meant to be different. Indeed, to earlier leaders like France’s Jacques Chirac, a rising China was welcome as another challenge to American hegemony, ushering in a “multipolar world” in which the EU would play a big role. If that meant kow-towing to Chinese demands to shun Taiwan, snub the Dalai Lama or tone down criticism of human-rights abuses, so be it. Most EU countries focused on commercial diplomacy with China, to ensure that their leaders’ visits could end with flashing cameras and the signing of juicy contracts.

Meanwhile, Europe’s trade deficit with China hit nearly∈170 billion ( $ 250 billion) last year. In five years, China wants 60% of car parts in new Chinese vehicles to be locally made. This is alarming news for Germany, the leading European exporter to China thanks to car parts, machine tools and other widgets.

As ever, Europeans disagree over how to respond. Some are willing to challenge China politically — for example, Germany, Britain, Sweden and the Netherlands. But they are mostly free traders. That makes them hostile when other countries call for protection against alleged Chinese cheating. In contrast, a block of mostly southern and central Europeans, dubbed “accommodating mercantilists” by the ECFR (The European Council on Foreign Relations), are quick to call for anti-dumping measures: But that makes them anxious to keep broader relations sweet by bowing to China on political issues.

The result is that European politicians often find themselves defending unconditional engagement with China. The usual claim is that this will slowly transform the country into a freer, more responsible stakeholder in the world. The secret, it is murmured, is to let Europe weave China into an entangling web of agreements and sectoral dialogues. In 2007 no fewer than 450 European delegations visited China. Big countries like France and Britain add their own bilateral dialogues, not trusting the EU to protect their interests or do the job properly. There are now six parallel EU and national “dialogues” with China on climate change, for example.

To deal with the trade deficit with China, Europeans()

A. will export more ear parts and other widgets

B. disaccord over the responding measures

C. challenge China on some political issues

D. will call for more anti-dumping measures